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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

MARK VON

STETTINA,

Case No.

15919

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, MARK

VON

STETTINA, appeals from a

conviction of Rape in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, MARK VON

STETTINA, was charged with Rape,

a Felony of the Second Degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-402 (1952 as amended) at jury trial before the Honorable
Dean E. Conder.

Appellant was convicted of the charge of Rape.

Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of one to fifteen years for said conviction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and judgement rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third Judicial
District Court for a new trial.
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~TATEMENT

OF THE FACTS

The State alleged that on July 3, 1979, Susie Stephenson,
was raped by the defendant, Mark

Stettina.

Von

At trial 21 year

old Susie Stephenson testified that at around midnight on July 3,
1979, she was at the Sun Tavern, a bar located in downtown Salt
Lake City.

She testified that she had arrived there about three

hours earlier in the company of her sister and some friends and that
she had been having a party and drinking with them and dancing with
some of the people at the bar.

She testified that she had been to

that bar on many previous occasions.

She testified that it was a

gay bar and explained that she liked to dance and drink there.
The prosecutrix met the appellant inside the Sun Tavern at approximately 12:20 a.m. when he went to her table and introduced himself
to her and asked her if she would like to dance.

She agreed.

He

then asked her if she wanted to go outside and smoke some marijuana
with him to which she also agreed.

The two of them went outside the

Sun Tavern and walked westward towards the Union Pacific Railroad
Depot and a parking lot just to the south side of the entrance.
Near that parking lot was a sloped grassy area out of the view of
the street.

They sat down together on the lawn.

filled with marijuana.

A pipe bowl was

They smoked the marijuana together. The

prosecutrix then testified that she wanted to go back and stood up
to leave.

The appellant took her arm and asked her to stay with him

until he finished smoking the marijuana.
beside him.

She agreed and sat down

He put his arm around her and kissed her.

-2-

Prosecutrix
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testified that she was frightened of him since she thought he was
not gay but straight.

She testified that he pushed her down on the

ground on her back and began to take her pants off.
that she said no.

She testified

She testified that he put his hand over her mouth

and said "Do you want me to kill you?"

She testified that he took

a tampon out of her and had intercourse with her.

Afterwards she

sat with him and kissed him and walked back to the bar with him
holding his hand and agreed to meet him later.

Other witnesses for

the State who had been at the bar and seen the prosecutrix at about
closing time testified that she was crying.

A police officer

testified that she cried throughout the time that she was with her.
Appellant was arrested in the area a short time later and made a
complete statement to the police.

Appellant testified at trial on

his own behalf that he was at the Sun Tavern and made contact with
Susie Stephenson at about midnight on July 3, 1979.
testified that he asked her to dance and she agreed.

He further
He asked her

then to go outside and smoke marijuana with him to which she also
agreed.

He described her as being friendly and nice and that they

carried on

a general conversation.

He testified that they smoked

marijuana together and that he began to kiss her and that he was
feeling the effects of marijuana and she appeared to be feeling the
effects of marijuana.

He testified that he began kissing her and

that he had one hand on her face as he was kissing her and he laid
her down on her back.

He testified that during that time she was

saying "no don't" and that she was giggling at the same time.
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

They then had sex and.they then got up and sat there for a minute
and kissed a few more times and started walking back across the
stree.:t:::holding hands.

Appellant stated that they continued talking an

found out more about one another,

Appellant asked her if she

wanted to go with him to have a few more beers and a little more
partying and she agreed.

He told her that he needed to get a payroll

check cashed at his place of employment which was Denny's and that
he would be back shortly to pick her up. He testified that he went
to a bar next door to the Sun and then on to Denny's.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF RAPE.
The standard for review of the sufficiency of the evidence
for a conviction is that "it must appear that upon so viewing
the evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a
reasonable doubt that the defendant cormnitted the crime".

State

v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (1977).
But when the sufficiency of the evidence is being reviewed in a sex-offense conviction,
There must be considered the ease of assertion
of the forcible accomplishment of the sexual
act, with impossibility of defense excepty by
direct denial, or of the proneness of the woman,
when she finds the fact of her disgrace discovered or likely of discovery to minimize
her_ fault by asserting force or violence, which
had led courts to hold to a very strict rule
of proof in such cases.
State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364 P.2d 109
at 112 (1961).

-4-
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The need for these added considerations in determining
the sufficiency of the evidence in a sex-offense is that the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix will be enough to sustain a conviction, State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197, 381 P.2d 81

(1963).

When the conviction is based upon the uncorroborated

testimony of a single complaining witness the appellate Court
must decide if the "evidence is so inherently improbable as to
be unworthy of belief, that upon objective analysis, reasonable
minds could not believe beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant
was guilty of the offense charged".

1272 (Utah, 1975).

~e

State v. Mills, 530 P.2d

also State v. Banks, 350 P.2d 416 (Utah 1960)

The essential elements of the crime of rape are given
in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-402 (1953 as amended).
A male person commits rape when he has sexual
intercourse with a female, not his wife,
without her consent. Consent is defined
by statute in Utah Code Annotated §76-5-406
(1953 as amended). The subsections applicable
in this case include:
(1) When the actor compels the victim
to submit or participate by force that
overcomes such earnest resistance as
might reasonably be expected under
the circumstances; or
,
(2) The actor compels the victim to
submit or participate by any threat
that would prevent resistance by a
person of ordinary resolution.
Finally, the State has the burden of proving the lack of consent
as an element of the crime.

State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347

P.2d 865 (1959).
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POINT A
THE PROSECUTRIX'S STORY IS INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE
BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE CORROBORATING HER
CLAIM OF A LACK OF CONSENT, THE EVIDENCE IS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
In this case the appellant was convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix.

But the prosecutrix's

testimony is so inherently improbable that it is unworthy of belief.

Thus, under State v. Mills, supra, this evidence is insuf-

ficient to support a conviction.
The prosecutrix's testimony was replete with inconsistencies and contradictions making her testimony improbable, and consequently unworthy of belief.
The major inconsistencies in the prosecutrix's testimony
are when she described her own actions on the night of incident.
She stated that she had had several drinks of alcoholic beverages
throughout the evening.

She stated that she had smoked a good

deal of a pipe of marijuana shared with the appellant.

She test-

ified that, however, none of these intoxicants had affected her
mind.

However, she was unclear on several of the sequences of

events including her testimony at preliminary hearing that she
stated that she had filled the pipe bowl with marijuana and at
trial that he had filled the pipe bowl with marijuana.

She by

her own description, her actions were by far more consenting then
not consenting.

She agreed to go with the appellant to dance, she

agreed to go with him to smoke marijuana, she agreed to allow him

-6-
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to put his arm around her and kiss her.

She agreed after sex to

have him continue to kiss her, she agreed to walk with him hand in
hand back to the Sun Tavern.

She agreed to meet him later.

She

testified that she did not want him to think that she was afraid.
She testified that she thought something would probably occur
with him even though she still agreed to go with him to a secluded
place.

She testified that she fought him to the extent that she

was able to get him off of her but that she did not run away nor
did she at anytime scream or hit him.

Because of these inconsist-

encies in certain aspects of her testimony concerning her ability
to resist appellants advances and her efforts to indicate to him
her consent the prosecutrix's story that the appellant forced her
to engage in sex without her consent is inherently improbable.
Thus, without further corroboration the prosecutrix's testimony
of her failure to consent to the intercourse is insufficient as
a matter of law to support a conviction.

The prosecutrix's test-

imony that intercourse occurred without consent is uncorroborated
and should be viewed carefully.

The prosecutrix testified that

at one point appellant's hand was over her mouth and nose and that
she though that her nose had been broken.
thathernose did not bleed.

She admitted, however,

No evidence was presented that she had

severe injuries to her facial area.

Witness who had seen the

appellant at the bar that evening and police who interviewed the
appellant at a later time did not present evidence that appellant
was angry or violent.

Consequently, reasonable minds would enter-
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tain a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the crime.
POINT B
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE LACK OF CONSENT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF REASONABLY EXPECTED
RESISTANCE TO BE OVERCOME BY FORCE AND THERE WAS
NO EVIDENCE OF IMMEDIATE THREATS WHICH WOULD
PREVENT RESISTANCE BY A PERSON OF ORDINARY
RESOLUTION.
Under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-406 (1953 as amended) a lack
of consent may be demonstrated by showing either force that overcomes a reasonable resistance or threats that would prevent
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution.
In State v. Horne, supra, the resistance that the law
requires a woman make is no "more than her age, strength, the
surrounding facts, and allattending circumstances make it reasonable for her to do in order to manifest her opposition".
p. 111, 112.

Id at

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court found that facts

insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction.
that the Court considered included:

The factor:

(1) during the period of time

that the defendant was in her trailer the prosecutrix made no
outcry; (2) the prosecutrix did not attempt to leave or seek help
during the indicent; (3) there was no evidence of marks or bruises;
(4) there was no evidence of threats made either upon the prosecutrix or her children; and (5) the length of time the prosecutrix waited before making a complaint.
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

During the time that the prosecutrix and appellant spent
together,
people

prosecutrix made no outcry.

Although she testified

were in the area and it was a public place.

Furthermore,

even though the prosecutrix testified that she felt that she was
going to have trouble she went with the appellant anyway and on
the way there passed several individuals in the area.
Secondly, the prosecutrix had ample opportunities to
get away from the appellant but did not avail herself to such
opportunities.
Thirdly, there was little or no evidence of a struggle.
The prosecutrix testified that she hurt her nose but there was
no observable evidence of actual injury.

She had no bruises,

abraisions, lacerations around the face and throat nor any to any
other area of her body.

She had no marks on her mouth

she testified that appellant had grabbed her.

where

Prosecutrix admits

that she did not strike appellant, nor scratch him, nor try to
hurt him even though she testified her hands were in no way bound.
Prosecutrix testified that appellant said, "Do you want me to
kill you?"

She also testified that she did not respond since she

did not want appellant to think that she was afraid.
claims that she was saying "No, no, no"
testified that

to appellant.

Prosecutrix
Appellant

while she said no that she was giggling and laughing

and that she had allowed him to be kissing her just previously.
Prosecutrix also stated that she had pleasant conversation with
appellant before and after sex had occurred.

That conversation

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

combined with the fact that there was no physical resistance does
not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the prosecutrix
resisted any force asserted by the appellant under the circumstances.
Another factor in the Horne case
evidence that threats had been made.
that~

was that there was no

Here, the prosecutrix claims

the appellant asked if she wanted him to kill her.

Prosecutrix

:i

testified that she had seen no evidence of a weapon and that she
had been able to push him away on her own.

This case is disting-

uishable from State v. Cederstrom, Utah Supreme Court No. 14777
(December, 1977), in that the prosecutrix in Cederstrom claimed
that the defendant also produced a knife,

screw driver, or other

object when making the threat that she would be hurt. Here no
weapon was displayed.

No weapon was ever found.

In fact, the

prosecutrix did not testify that the appellant had a weapon or
threatened to use a weapon.

Similarly, this case is distinguishable::

from State v. Studham,572 P.2d 700 (1977).

In the Studham case,

this Court found several facts which in totality added to the

circumstances, the prosecutrix had resisted force sufficient to meet~
the standards in the Horne case. In that case, the evidence showed
that the prosecutrix had a young son in the apartment and that she
had a bruise or cut on her lip.

The prosecutrix had testified that

defendant had told her that she would not live to be past the age
of twenty-one.

The threats, combined with the concern of the

safety of the young child and the bruises or cut on her lip, were
-10-
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sufficient to show that the prosecutrix had acted reasonably under
the circumstances.
several grounds.

This case is distinguishable, however, on
First of all, the prosecutrix had no young son

or other person to protect besides herself.

Secondly, this act

occurred in a public place not too far from a well traveled area
in which the prosecutrix knew that there was other people.

Thirdly,

prosecutrix displayed no signs of physical injury or trauma such
that might be expected if one had resisted force.

It must be

remembered that in this case, the prosecutrix is 21 years old and
in good health.

She had not been forced to go any place that she

did not want to go.

In fact, she had agreed to go with appellant.

She had agreed to smoke marijuana with appellant.

She had agreed

to allow him to kiss her and put his arm around her.
to meet him later.

She agreed

She was aware at the Sun Tavern that people

do go with one another to have sex.

She testified that she suspected

that something was going to happen.

Yet in this case the prosecutrix

put up no recognizable physical resistance other than the words
no, no, no, gave very little indication of lack of consent.
Combined with the fact that she had agreed to several other acts,
and that she had partaken of intoxicants which may have caused her
to giggle and laugh is apparent that no lack of consent was displayed by the prosecutrix.
On the basis of these facts, a reasonable mind would
entertain a reasonable doubt that there was a lack of consent on
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the part of the prosecutrix, and judgment must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case is insufficient for the
appellant to be convicted of rape.

The prosecutrix testified

that there was a threat made to her.

However, this is in direct

conflict with the appellant's testimony concerning the events.
Furthermore, the prosecutrix testified that at one point she was
able to get the appellant away from her but made no move to run
away from him.

The prosecutrix's lack of consent was not evi-

denced by resistance reasonable for her age, strength, the
surrounding facts and attending circumstances.

The prosecutrix

testified she did not see any weapon nor was there any threat
made with regard to a weapon and that combined with the fact that
she knew that she was able to get away from appellant by her own
testimony shows that the prosecutrix did not resist in a way
reasonably expected under the circumstances.

Her only indication

to appellant that she did not consent was when she said no, no.
This, however, could be misinterpretted as no resistance if combined
with giggling.

At no time did the prosecutrix

make an attempt to

leave the area after she had agreed to kiss the appellant and
allow him to have his arm around her.

She did not make any attempt

to attract the attention of others even though she knew that there
were other people in the area.

Prosecutrix suffered no physical

injury, there was no physical damage to any of her clothing as
a result of this incident.

Furthermore, as she was returning to
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the tavern the prosecutrix agreed to meet the appellant at a
later time and continued to converse with him and continued to
walk hand in hand with him.

The total circumstances surrounding

this incident give rise to a reasonable doubt.

The evidence was

insufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime of rape.
Respectfully submitted,

G. L. FLETCHER
Attorney for Appellant

-13-
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